This essay uses an approach borrowed from environmental history to investigate the interaction of science and nature in a late twentieth-century controversy. This debate, over the proper response to fire ants that had been imported into the American South accidentally and then spread across the region, pitted Rachel Carson and loosely federated groups of conservationists, scientists, and citizens against the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The analysis falls into three sections: an examination of the natural history of the ants; an examination of the views of the competing factions; and an examination of how those views, transformed into action, affected the natural world. Both sides saw the ants in terms of a constellation of beliefs about the relationship between nature, science, and democracy. As various ideas were put into play, they interacted with the natural history of the insects in unexpected ways-and with consequences for the cultural authority of the antagonists. Combining insights from the history of science and environmental history helps explain how scientists gain and lose cultural authority and, more fundamentally, allows for an examination of how nature can be integrated into the history of science.
I N HER 1962 BESTSELLER SILENT SPRING, Rachel
Carson attacked the profligate use of pesticides, arguing that the chemicals did little to control insects but were deadly to wildlife, livestock, and humans. She pointed to the federal campaign to eradicate imported fire ants from the American South as evidence. The ants had arrived in Mobile, Alabama, in the late 1910s. By the 1950s they had spread across the South, and suddenly there was a roar of complaint: the ants reportedly attacked crops, killed wildlife, worried livestock, built large earthen mounds that interfered with farm machinery, and stung painfully. Carson suspected that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) had fabricated these claims in order to justify a huge program to eradicate the insects and increase its bureaucratic strength. The measures taken killed quail and rabbits, cows and pigs, and threatened human health. Carson called the USDA program "an outstanding example of an ill-conceived, badly executed, and thoroughly detrimental experiment in the mass control of insects." Hers was not the only voice raised in protest. Concerned citizens, entomologists, hunters, nascent environmental groups, and wildlife biologists urged the department to end the eradication program. Complaints continued into the late 1970s, when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finally banned the chemicals used to eradicate the fire ants. Carson's philippic was one salvo in a conflict that would last twenty years, a conflict so intense it was dubbed "the fire ant wars." 1 This essay explores the interaction of nature and science in the fire ant wars by combining methodologies from the history of science and environmental history. Over the past quarter century, historians of science have staked out a constructivist approach that focuses on the way social processes are implicated in the manufacture of all natural knowledge. While not necessarily opposed to examining the role of the material world in the construction of scientific ideas, earlier constructivist analyses focused on the social machinery of science, ignoring nature. More recently, there have been a number of efforts to broaden constructivism by making the natural world an actor in historical narratives. 2 This essay attempts something similar by importing techniques from environmental history. Environmental historians take as their central topic the study of the interactions between humans and nature at different times and in different places. William Cronon has argued that to fulfill this agenda historians need to answer three intertwined questions: How does nature work in the time and place being studied? How do humans view the natural world and create ideas about nature? And how do those ideas, transformed into action, affect the natural world? 3 The second question is that asked by constructivist historians of science; the first and the third investigate the role of the natural world. As these three questions are addressed, and connections are drawn between the answers, the integral place of the material world in histories of science is revealed.
Nature, in this essay, is embodied by the fire ants. The insects are opportunistic organisms, adapted to disruption, that exploited the changing ecology of the mid-twentiethcentury American South. Neither the USDA entomologists nor their opponents focused on the cause of the ants' irruption, however. The federal employees, excited by the power of the new insecticides that had been introduced after World War II and worried that the ants threatened agricultural production, thought only of finding the most efficient methods to kill them. (See Frontispiece.) Carson, her allies, and her descendants, on the contrary, saw the insects as ecological innocents, not exploiters of the South's ecology but organisms that found a niche in North American ecology. The real threat, they said, was posed by bureaucrats who intervened in natural processes, disrupting nature and chipping away at personal liberties. Both sides expressed their views through vocabulary borrowed from debates over the structure of American democracy during the Cold War. Simultaneously reflecting alternative interpretations of the relationship between nature, science, and the state and offering a powerfully persuasive rhetorical tool, the Cold War imagery gave the fire ant wars their form and their urgency: for combatants on both sides, the imagined ends of the Cold War came to stand for the imagined ends of the fire ant wars, with both the response to the insects and the proper structuring of the American democratic system at stake. 4 The two sides alternated in seeing their views realized: first the USDA attempted to eradicate the ants; then, in the 1970s, the agency's opponents successfully banned the insecticides and the insects were allowed to integrate into the southern ecology. The ideas, however, were not simply imposed on a passive nature. The biology of the ants and the actions of the two groups interacted in unexpected ways, with repercussions for the insects and the world that they inhabited as well as for the humans who claimed to understand them.
THE NATURAL HISTORY OF THE IMPORTED FIRE ANTS
Fire ants belong to the subgenus Solenopsis, a diverse group of ants that originated in South America about sixty-five million years ago. All Solenopsis possess a stinger that gives the group its common name. The insects at the heart of the fire ant wars were actually two closely related species from this assemblage: Solenopsis richteri, a brown or black 3 William Cronon, "The Uses of Environmental History," Environmental History Review, 1993, 17:1-22 . For reviews of the field more generally see Donald Worster, "History as Natural History: An Essay on Theory and Method," Pacific History Review, 1984, 53:1-19; Kendall E. Bailes, ed., Environmental History: Critical Issues in Comparative Perspective (Lanham, Md.: Univ. Press America, 1985) ; Richard White, "American Environmental History: The Development of a New Historical Field," Pacific Hist. Rev., 1985, 54:297-335 ; Cronon, "Modes of Prophecy and Production: Placing Nature in History," Journal of American History, 1990 History, , 76:1122 History, -1131 White, "Environmental History, Ecology, and Meaning," ibid., pp. 1111-1116 ; Worster, "Transformations of the Earth: Toward an Agro-Ecological Perspective in History," ibid., pp. 1087-1106; Cronon, "A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative," ibid., 1992 , 78:1347 -1376 I. G. Simmonds, Environmental History: A Concise Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) ; Worster, "Nature and the Disorder of History," Environ. Hist. Rev., 1994, 18:1-15; and Mart A. Stewart, "Environmental History: Profile of a Developing Field," History Teacher, 1998, 31:351-368 . 4 On the wider point see Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1985) , p. 15: "Solutions to the problem of knowledge are embedded within practical solutions to the problem of social order, and . . . different practical solutions to the social order encapsulate contrasting practical solutions to the problem of knowledge." ant with a yellow stripe across its gaster; and Solenopsis invicta, a red species. Entomologists noted the color differences early on, but since the insects are otherwise hard to distinguish they lumped the two under the name Solenopsis saevissima richteri, "most savage fire ant." They were considered the same species that the English naturalist Henry Walter Bates had seen attacking the village of Aveyros in the Amazon River Basin. "A greater plague than all other [insects] put together," he had called them; they ate everything in sight and attacked people "out of sheer malice."
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The two species originally inhabited different parts of the world's largest wetland, an expanse of marshy land that follows the Río Paraguay and the Río Parana through Brazil, Paraguay, and northern Argentina to their confluence with the Río de la Plata and ultimately into the Atlantic Ocean. Solenopsis richteri lives on the periphery of this wetland, its range edging into the Pampas. Solenopsis invicta can be found throughout the marshy river basins. The area is characterized by frequent disturbances. During the dry season, thick grasses clog the riverbeds; when the rains come, the water is forced to cut new channels, eventually overflowing and flooding the landscape. The river's vagrancy has created a wealth of microclimates, and the area is dominated by a rich array of plants. In 1929 a geographer noted, "The most striking feature in the natural vegetation is its lack of uniformity." The ants have adapted to this situation by exploiting the disturbances. They are opportunistic-one entomologist calls them "weeds"-infiltrating disrupted areas, growing quickly-a single queen gives birth to 250,000 workers in three years-but are forced out when the ecology matures. 6 Solenopsis richteri was the first of the two species to break from the wetland and travel north. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Argentina's cattle industry flourished and international trade was brisk. The ants, which lived near major points of distribution, stowed away on ships, reaching Mobile, Alabama, around 1918. The new world the insects faced was climatically similar to South America but ecologically very different. "Extensive timberlands and swamps, almost quite impenetrable," surrounded Mobile. Approximately 80 percent of the land within a hundred-mile radius of the port city was thick forest. The rest of the southern coastal plain was equally uninviting, devoted to fields often 5 Henry Walter Bates, The Naturalist on the Rivers Amazon (1863; London: Murray, 1892), p. 227. (The imported fire ants are no longer believed to be the same species as the ants Bates saw.) Fire ant biology is reviewed in Clifford S. Lofgren, William A. Banks, and B. Michael Glancey, "Biology and Control of Imported Fire Ants," Annual Review of Entomology, 1975, 20:1-30 America, 1997, 43:23-39; and Stephen Welton Taber, Fire Ants (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2000) . I simplify a more complicated taxonomic history. In any case, the distinction between the imported fire ants and the fire ants of Aveyros was never that great and was largely erased by the late 1950s. For a fuller discussion see Joshua Blu Buhs, "The Fire Ant Wars: Solenopsis and the Nature of the American State, 1918 " (Ph.D. diss., Univ. Pennsylvania, 2001 , Ch. 2. 6 The ecology of the region is described in E. W. America, 1998, 81:76-81. left fallow by sharecroppers and groves of trees allowed to grow dense. With nowhere to go, the ants settled into the Government Street Loop, a rundown section of Mobile where the trolleys turned around. 7 Some two decades later, after the cattle industry reached deeper into the South American interior where Solenopsis invicta lived, the red ants also reached Mobile. As they arrived, the South was on the brink of a revolution that would alter the ecology of the region, opening vast new spaces for the ants to colonize.
Beginning in the 1930s the USDA began to modernize the South, making it more efficient, more like the Midwest. Tractors, harvesters, and combines replaced field hands and farms grew in size, doubling in Alabama and tripling in Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi between 1920 and 1969. Wastelands were plowed under, groves of trees felled, and fields seeded from fencepost to fencepost. New crops were cultivated, especially soybeans, and cattle. During World War II military contracts were sent south, absorbing the idle workforce and pulling rural citizens into urban areas. Cities sprawled "with little attention to urban planning and zoning," and suburbs suddenly appeared. The southern historian C. Vann Woodward called these interlocking changes "the bulldozer revolution." That revolution would last into the 1970s, transforming the South into the Sun Belt. 8 The spread of Solenopsis invicta was an unexpected consequence of this modernization process. Thriving in disturbed areas, the ants were presented with a vast extent of disrupted habitats to exploit. Humans also unwittingly provided a means of transport out of Mobile and across the South. For decades southern nurseries had struggled against discriminatory railroad rates that favored the North. With the postwar economic boom road building increased, the trucking industry introduced cheap transport, and nurseries bloomed. Mobile became the nation's fifth largest horticultural center. The ants found their way into nursery stock and were shipped across the region and deposited in just the kinds of disrupted sites-suburban developments, highway rights of way-that they preferred. The late-arriving red ants were not as restricted in their distribution as their congeners and so were better prepared to take advantage of the changing southern ecology. Solenopsis richteri languished, reaching only parts of northern Alabama and northern Mississippi; Solenopsis invicta spread widely. 9 By the mid 1950s, the red ants could be found in nine southern states. The ants are omnivorous: they prefer insects but take whatever food is available. As their population increased, they could not always find favored foods, and their turn to other caloric sources brought them to the attention of southerners. The ants ate seeds and crops and even young quail-which caused consternation, since the birds were the South's most important game animals. They colonized lawns and the open spaces of the newly built military bases, where they came into intimate contact with humans. In 1955 a boy in New Orleans died after being stung three times. Two years later ant stings sent three soldiers from Maxwell Air Force Base to the hospital. The imported fire ants especially favored cow pastures, fields that were open and constantly disrupted by the big beasts. 10 It might have been possible to ignore many of these problems-the boy's death notwithstanding, the ants killed far fewer people than bees and wasps-except that the spread of the ants was so dramatic and so intense that ignoring the formicids was difficult. In traveling to North America, the ants had left behind predators and parasites; the bulldozer revolution diminished competition. Freed from constraints, the ants' population exploded-sometimes the insects built a hundred mounds on a single acre of land Bulletin 737, February 1967.) Many organisms introduced into new environments undergo similarly dramatic increases in their population and density. The increase is usually followed by an equally dramatic crash, as parasites and predators attack the newcomers, the ecology of the area stabilizes, and the imported organisms compete among themselves for increasingly scarce resources.
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To a point the imported fire ants followed this pattern, as both their number and population density declined in the years after introduction, but there were also significant deviations. The bulldozer revolution accounts for some of the deviation, ensuring that there were always new areas for the ants to exploit as suburbs sprawled, old areas were razed, and new roads were built. Looking at the course of invasion over a single patch of groundsouthern Alabama, say-reveals the familiar rise-and-fall pattern. On a regional scale, however, the irruption continued, as the ants found their way to more and more parts of the South. By 1957 they had spread from Mobile to cover twenty million acres.
The rest of the deviation from the expected pattern is explained by a biological quirk. In their homeland, Solenopsis invicta populations live in two social forms: monogynous Science, 1991 Science, , 253:1099 Science, -1104 and polygynous colonies. Monogynous colonies have a single queen that mates in aerial swarms and founds her colony independently; polygynous colonies contain several, sometimes several hundred, queens, most of which mate within the nest and form new colonies by adopting workers from the mother colony, walking to a likely nearby area, and building a new nest. Both forms arrived in America. Bigger and stronger, the monogynous queens initially predominated. They could spread widely and colonize many disturbed habitats quickly. But as the environment became saturated with ants, the polygynous colonies came to dominate. Young queens were protected in the nest and were subsidized by the mother colony when founding their own nests. The increasing prevalence of polygyny allowed more and more ants to be packed into the same area, softening the expected crash in the fire ant population. In the 1990s, some fields in Texas sagged under the weight of over four hundred imported fire ant mounds per acre.
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IDEAS ABOUT NATURE: THE FIRE ANTS IN A COLD WAR
Eradicating the Fire Ants
The spread of the fire ants occurred in a postwar America optimistic about the future and confident that it could use its natural resources, science and technology, and democratic institutions to solve any problem. The economy hummed, domestic problems seemingly obliterated by the power of mass consumption. Antibiotics had a death-grip on disease. The federal government was in the capable hands of the affable Dwight Eisenhower. But beneath this optimism was a dark layer of concern. Science brought not only antibiotics but also the bomb, radioactive fallout, and pollution. Conformity was the root not only of the good economy but also of totalitarianism. And democratic institutions, while guaranteeing that Americans were the freest people on earth, could also be perverted to squash the very individual liberties they purported to defend. How best to live in nature, how to use science and technology, and how to bring nature, science, and technology to bear on the maintenance of democratic traditions-these were all questions that would become intertwined with the fire ant wars.
14 Control entomologists and their administrative allies within the USDA shared a vision of how nature, science, and democracy related. Nature, they thought, was imperfect: insects destroy crops, diseases kill livestock, and weather is foe as often as friend. Survival is a struggle, achieved only by the correct application of scientific ideas to hold the forces of nature at bay and protect civilization. One entomologist wrote, "To clothe and feed [the growing U.S.] population man must maintain his position of dominance, and our agricultural production must continue to increase even at the expense of the further displacement of native plants and animals."
15 By the time the fire ants had spread across the South, the USDA had adopted insecticides as a principal weapon in the struggle against nature. Control (or economic) entomologists who supported the use of the chemicals had elbowed aside other insect biologists (often called research entomologists) who supplemented the use of chemical insecticide with biological and cultural controls to manage insect outbreaks. They pointed out that DDT was safer than the arsenic and cyanide solutions used by earlier generations of entomologists and that it had been used in World War II to protect American soldiers from typhus and malaria. Now, they reasoned, that insecticide and its chemical relatives could be used to protect public health and agricultural production. Entomologists need not be limited to controlling insects-the mark of old-fashioned entomology-but could eradicate them completely. The chemicals, they admitted, might kill wildlife and other desirable animals as well, but the gain in farming efficiency was well worth the cost. One farmer made the calculus explicit, noting, "I believe I have been as much for conserving our wildlife as the next one and have spent a great deal of effort and money to see wildlife increase but if one of us should be hurt by treating the land for fire ants I do not believe it should be the man who owns the land and pays taxes on the same, especially when it means the survival of himself and family."
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Using science to control the ants did more than preserve public health and increase agricultural production, the federal economic entomologists contended. Insecticides helped the nation in its struggle with the Soviet Union. It was an article of faith at the USDA that American democracy grew from the soil: agriculture was a Cold War weapon. Byron Shaw, head of the USDA's Agricultural Research Service, for example, said in 1958, "I think the times were described rather aptly a year or so ago, when a Soviet premier told an American television audience that communism would win its contest with capitalism when the Soviets' per-capita production of meat, milk and butter surpassed that of the United States. He was really saying that a nation is as strong as its agriculture." Eradicating the ants would allow the United States to increase its productivity and win the Cold War. If, on the contrary, the ants were left to spread, agricultural output would plummet, dissatisfaction would increase, and the seeds of revolution would be sown.
to study the insects. Wilson and a classmate determined that the ants significantly damaged the state's agriculture. Worse, he concluded that the red ants were newly evolved mutants that were better adapted to life in North America and more aggressive than their black counterparts. The taxonomic decision explained the chronology of the ants' irruption without reference to the bulldozer revolution: the ants, Wilson argued, had remained unremarkable until the mutation appeared sometime around the end of World War II, allowing the insects to spread across the South. Wilson's ideas made the ants even more threatening and unpredictable-a constantly evolving pest. Thus C. C. Fancher, head of the USDA's fire ant program, could say without irony that the eradication of the insects would protect "the American way of life" and provide a "service for mankind."
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In popular culture more broadly, other connections were drawn between the ants and communist subversives. The insects lived in a hierarchically arranged social system that extinguished individualism-they were "regimented automatons, driven, dutiful in their prescribed pointless doing." The ants undermined the concept of private property, building their mounds without respect for property lines and making capitalist production difficult. They also perverted gender roles-the males reduced to mere bearers of sperm that died after mating and the females ruling the colony-just as communists promised to abolish sexual hierarchies. As the fire ants impinged on southern life, the connections between the insects and communists were made quickly and easily. One newspaper labeled the insects "the red peril" and "fifth columnists," while a hunting magazine noted, "This ferocious little ant . . . has carried communism to the ultimate, and its actions suggest a certain coldblooded intelligence." 19 Military metaphors permeate the history of insect control, and Americans have a long tradition of drawing parallels between insects and ostracized humans. But despite the triteness of the language (or maybe because of it), the analogy was useful to the USDA. Natural History, 1959, 68:276-281; Wilson, "The Fire Ant," Scientific American, 1958, 198:36-41, 160 To eradicate the ants, the federal agency needed to spread insecticides on all land, "without regard to location, land use, or ownership." If any land was left untreated, some ants might survive and spread, threatening American agriculture. Broad support was necessary to ensure that all land could be sprayed. Drawing on the shared Cold War imagery, the USDA worked to generate the needed mandate. A department press release, for example, noted, "Uncle Sam is ready to use a fleet of 60 planes to go to war against the dreaded fire ant. . . . Only the modern airplane, dropping insecticides on twenty million acres in the critical area, can hope to stop the menace." The word "menace," of course, had deeper connotations, evoking concerns over the Red Menace. Congressional testimony in favor of the eradication program drew on the same lexicon. One southerner testified, "The government should be building as big a defense against the fire ants as they are against the Russians. 
Naturalizing the Imported Fire Ants
As the USDA entomologists worked to put their ideas into practice, a loosely federated group of biologists, citizens, early environmentalists, and hunters offered an alternative vision of how nature, science, and democracy fit together and, consequently, an alternative response to the ants. To varying extents, the members of this group saw nature not as imperfect but as finely tuned and integrated. Over the course of the previous two decades, wildlife biologists had shown how animal populations kept each other in balance. For an even longer time, both research and control entomologists-before they were elbowed aside by the upstarts promising to use insecticides for eradication-had studied insects as part of an ecological community. 22 In their view, the job of the scientist was not to battle nature but to elucidate natural processes and find ways to accommodate human life to natural rhythms. This understanding of the relationship between science and nature was thought to serve democracy in several different ways. Some saw the protection of nature as the promotion of spiritual values above economic ones and thus a means for creating a better citizenry. Some felt that wildlife was one of the nation's most important natural resources and that its conservation was a way of maintaining U.S. strength. Others felt that a commitment to living in accord with nature proved the vitality of democratic institutions. If insecticides, say, were used without regulation, killing wildlife, it would mean that agricultural agencies had gained too much power, warping the political process and silencing those who voiced concern for wildlife. A rich, varied natural world was evidence of a strong democracy, in which policies were set to appease competing factions. The USDA's policy of favoring agriculture over wildlife in the fire ant wars represented a threat to American democracy.
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Research by university entomologists provided evidence for these views. These studies did not examine the invasion as a regional phenomenon but instead studied the insects in limited locations that they had inhabited for some time-places where the irruption was ending and the damage done by the ants was less intense. For example, Kirby Hays, an entomologist at the Alabama Polytechnic Institute (renamed Auburn in 1960), visited South America in early 1957 and was told by local scientists that the ants were considered beneficial because they preyed on other insects. Research on the insects' behavior conducted in Alabama by Hays's brother Sydney, a graduate student at Auburn, substantiated these opinions. The younger Hays tested the feeding preference of laboratory-reared imported fire ants and found that they ate only insects, becoming cannibalistic rather than consuming plant material. Another Auburn graduate student showed that the ants consumed no more than 4 percent of young quail, and research in Louisiana determined that the ants were major predators of sugarcane borers and, perhaps, boll weevils. In 1958 a report by the Alabama state forester that had been written at the time of Wilson's survey reappeared. The ants, it claimed, were not pests.
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These reports became the basis of Carson's discussion of the ants in Silent Spring. While writing the book Carson had corresponded with Wilson and learned that he considered reports of the ants' beneficial traits exaggerated, but she ignored his conclusions and concentrated on the positive aspects of the ants' biology. Carson reinterpreted the meaning of the nests, for example, seeing them not as impediments to agricultural production but as necessary to the ecology of the earth. "Their mound-building activities," she wrote, "serve a useful purpose in aerating and draining the soil." Her book, she concluded, "thoroughly documented that the fire ant has never been a menace to agriculture and that the facts concerning it have been completely misrepresented." Ignoring the distinctions between the two species (or mutants) and the role that humans had played in the irruption, Carson argued that for most of the ants' time in North America they had been inconsequential. The sudden interest in them resulted from USDA propaganda, not biology; the ants were actually well-behaved parts of the ecosystem. In the late 1930s Carson had written an essay about the starling, a bird imported into America that many considered a pest but that she thought was becoming a necessary part of the American ecological order. She argued that it was time to give the starling citizen papers. Twenty years later, she was working to naturalize another immigrant, the imported fire ants. The insecticides, by contrast, remained outside the American ecological order, a true threat. Biologists monitoring the effect of the fire ant program found dead wildlife at every spot that they checked. The Alabama Department of Conservation, for example, found sixty-eight dead animals on a one-hundred-acre plot of land, while biologists with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, scouting a two-acre sample plot in Georgia, found six dead quail, seven dead rabbits, twenty dead songbirds, three dead rodents, and one dead cat, all with enough insecticide in their bodies to account for their deaths; two months after the application, they could not find a single live bird. (See Figure 3. ) Quail populations plumrichteri Forel," J. Econ. Entomol. 1959, 52:455-457 ; K. Hays, "Ecological Observations on the Imported Fire Ant, Solenopsis saevissima richteri Forel, in Alabama," J. Alabama Acad. Sci., 1959, 30:14-18 ; Albert S. Johnson, "Antagonistic Relationships between Ants and Wildlife with Special Reference to Imported Fire Ants and Bobwhite Quail in the Southeast," Proc. Ann. Conf. Southeastern Assoc. Game and Fish Commissioners, 1961, 15:88-107; and Johnson, " June-July 1939, 32:317-319 . E. O. Wilson, then at Harvard University, and the USDA entomologists both dismissed the Hays brothers' work: the ants were mutants, they said, and their behavior in North America could not be predicted from their behavior south of the equator, nor could the actions of the insects in the wild be understood by studying them in a lab. They charged that the Auburn entomologists were also chronically confused by the taxonomy of the fire ants, often mistaking native fire ants for the imports, and so their conclusions could not be trusted. Creighton to Walter H. Grimes, 19 Nov. 1957 , 23 Nov. 1957 , and Smith to Creighton, 9 Dec. 1957 , 19 Feb. 1969 , Creighton Papers; portion of a letter to Abbot, 27 June 1957, Box 62, Fire Ant File; Wilson to Burlap, 11 Jan. 1959 , Wilson to Lofgren, 11 Feb. 1959 , and Wilson to Burgess, 11 Feb. 1959 Papers, 1943-1951, SG 17018, Alabama Department of Archives and History.) meted by almost 90 percent. Livestock, as well, frequently died, and the chemicals were seeping into the milk supply and, possibly, into the bodies of children. Research entomologists working for the USDA added their voices to the chorus of complaint, advocating studies of biological and cultural control as a supplement to the use of chemical insecticides. The federal control entomologists were not working with nature, their opponents charged, but against it. The application of the insecticides, Carson wrote, "follow[ed] the impetuous, heedless pace of man, not the deliberate pace of nature."
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The eradication was more than a threat to wildlife. It was a threat to democracy, the USDA's opponents said, turning the federal agency's rhetoric on its head. The critique of the fire ant program raised a serious question: If the insects were not pests and the insecticides were so deadly, why would the USDA undertake to eradicate the ants? To answer these questions, the USDA's opponents called on a traditional American distrust of centralized governmental control. Antistatism has a long history in America, but it took on a particular intensity during the Cold War. As the historian Michael Hogan has shown, there was a widespread fear that in building a national security system against communism, the United States would take on the traits of its enemy. National defense required centralized control and secrecy and conformity, all characteristics of the Soviet Union. The Cold War, many feared, would transform the United States into a garrison state. The USDA had already defined itself as part of the national security system, and the agency's determination to pursue the eradication ideal demanded centralized control. Carson and others drew on these tropes to attack the USDA. Why would the USDA spread deadly chemicals against a pest that was not a pest? Because the agency was drunk on its own power and beyond democratic accountability. 27 In Silent Spring Carson wrote, "Who has decided-who has the right to decide-for the countless legions of people who were not consulted that the supreme value is a world without insects, even though it be also a sterile world ungraced by the curving wing of a bird in flight? The decision is that of the authoritarian temporarily entrusted with power." Others followed the same line of reasoning. The wildlife biologist Clarence Cottam, for example, wrote, "I am convinced some of the philosophies expressed and actions taken by the pest control arm of our Federal Department of Agriculture strike at the very heart of American democracy. The problems, therefore, far transcend the control program or any entomological considerations." He urged others to agitate against eradication campaigns and avoid becoming "numbered pawns of the state." This form of critique was so powerful that it drew to wildlife groups some who opposed the growth of bureaucracies but had little interest in wildlife. The Mobile nursery owner J. Lloyd Abbot, for instance, joined the Alabama Wildlife Federation explicitly to stop the imported fire ant program not because he worried about the danger of insecticides but because "the threat to the continued existence of our Democracy, and whether or not we are going to be taken over by internal bureaucracies, could not be more clearly illustrated than it is by this whole reprehensible situation."
The USDA's opponents had more difficulties putting their vision of the relationship between nature, science, and democracy into practice than had the department. The agricultural agency was one of the most powerful federal bureaucracies, and control entomologists had embedded themselves deeply within a network of relationships with powerful allies. No attempts to stop pesticide use gained much political traction in the 1960s, but the protest against the imported fire ant program seemed the least likely to succeed. Just as Silent Spring was published in 1962, the USDA introduced a new insecticide for eradicating the ants, Mirex, that nullified the objections of the department's opponents. Billed as the perfect pesticide, Mirex was less harmful to vertebrates than its predecessors and was used at the incredibly low dose of one-seventh of an ounce per acre. With little left to object to and little power, the USDA's opponents turned their attention to other issues. When Carson died in 1965, the fire ant wars seemed to be over.
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"The Vietnam of Entomology"
By the 1970s, however, the situation had changed: Mirex was seen as dangerous and the environmentalists were on the ascendancy. Richard Nixon, wanting to coopt a Democratic constituency, created the Environmental Protection Agency and charged it with regulating the introduction of chemicals into the environment. An increasingly self-conscious environmental movement allied with the EPA to ban dozens of insecticides, most famously DDT, institutionalizing their ideas about the proper relationship between nature and science and endeavoring to create what they considered a more democratic nation. 30 In 1973, prompted by the Environmental Defense Fund, the agency initiated a court case over the fate of the fire ant eradication program. In the years since it had been called the perfect pesticide, Mirex had been shown to accumulate in the fat of fish, kill shrimp and crabs, and, possibly, cause cancer. 31 The ants, on the contrary, were even more firmly established as nonthreatening. In the late 1960s some of E. O. Wilson's older contemporaries, feeling overshadowed by the young man's rapid ascent, revisited his taxonomic work-"Someone has to do the niddy-griddies to check out Wilson's theories while he continues onward and upward to still greater and greater glories"-and determined that the red and black ant forms were not mutants, but separate species, and that the red form was not as dangerous as Wilson had implied. Others suggested that the ants were a key part of the southern ecosystem that should not be removed. Even Wilson had changed his mind, calling the eradication program "the Vietnam of entomology": a battle with inchoate goals and no clear winners, only loss. 32 The power of the EPA and the environmental movement slowly overwhelmed those promoting the eradication of the fire ants. The court case over the fire ant program and Mirex did not definitively settle the matter, but it made the cost of continuing too high for Allied Chemical, the maker of the insecticide. In 1976 Allied dropped out of the proceedings, selling its plant to the State of Mississippi for one dollar. Mississippi's waxing was short-lived, however. Two years later, the EPA determined that Mirex and its by-products caused cancer and that the chemical could be found in the bodies of almost one in every two Mississippians. The use of Mirex was phased out. 33 In the years since it had been established, the EPA had also banned all other chemicals used to eradicate the imported fire ants. By the end of the 1970s, the fire ant wars were over. The ants were left to accommodate themselves to life in North America, safe from chemical attack.
IDEAS INTO ACTIONS: THE EFFECT OF THE FIRE ANTS WARS
The USDA and its opponents had focused on different aspects of the natural history of the imported fire ants, generalizing particular traits into the essence of the animal-like the five blind men of legend who touched different parts of an elephant and divined its essence from those parts, one touching the tail and deciding that an elephant was like a rope and another feeling the ear and deciding that the beast was like parchment. Committed to protecting American agriculture and confronting the ants on a regional scale, the federal entomologists focused on the negative aspects of the insects. (See Figure 4 .) The dissenters, on the contrary, looking at the invasion on a smaller scale and wedded to the belief that nature was an integrated whole, studied the places where the irruption was dying and determined that the ants were no longer pests. They pointed to the way the opportunistic ants preyed on other insects as evidence of their beneficence and their acceptance into the American ecological order. Both sets of ideas, however, were simplifications of a more complicated natural history. When they were transformed into action and applied through American agricultural and environmental policy, the friction between the ideas and the reality created situations that no one expected.
The USDA entomologists believed that nature could be remade without consequence and so applied the insecticides fully expecting to eradicate the ants. The insecticides, however, were broad-spectrum poisons that killed huge numbers of insects and game animals. They disrupted the areas where they were applied, much as the vagaries of the rivers of South America did. Imported fire ants reinvaded the poisoned parcels of land, mocking the eradication ideal. In 1957, for example, Arkansas was declared ant-free after twelve thousand acres were sprayed. In 1958, however, the ants occupied ten thousand (From "$10 Million Sought to Fight Fire Ants," Montgomery Advertiser, 8 March 1957 , Box 65, Fire Ant News Clippings File, Entomology Research Division: General Correspondence, 1954 acres, many of them areas that had been treated previously. And in 1959 the ants could be found on twenty-five thousand acres. By 1960 the USDA noticed the reinvasion problem on a regional scale. One disappointed entomologist complained, "It is probable that the acreage being reinfested plus the expansion into new areas each year is as great as the acreage that can be treated with presently available funds. The program can hardly be termed an eradication program if there is no net gain in acreage free from ants." Over the course of the fire ant wars, the USDA tried a number of different insecticides and a number of different rates of application, but all failed. 34 of control entomologists. Control entomologists had bet their scientific legitimacy on eradication: C. C. Fancher had announced at the beginning of the fire ant program, "It would be a disgrace to entomologists of this country to permit the imported fire ant to become established." 35 As the program progressed, though, the dream faded. The ants continued to spread, as did other insects targeted by the USDA-bark beetles, gypsy moths, Japanese beetles.
By the 1960s the embarrassment was acute, and it would only get worse. Even with the introduction of the so-called perfect pesticide, many entomologists in the USDA doubted whether eradication was possible. 36 Their backbone stiffened in 1969 when Nixon appointed J. Phil Campbell to the USDA. A former commissioner of agriculture in Georgia, Campbell had built his career battling the ants and demanded that the agency renew its commitment to eradication. Campbell's enthusiasm, though, could not stem the spread of the insects. In 1978, deciding that the battle could not be won, the USDA shifted all funding for the program away from control entomologists, awarding it instead to insect biologists who hewed to older traditions in entomology, investigating insect natural history and employing biological and cultural control. Study of parasites and predators increased, and in 1995 the agency began releasing into the wild flies that decapitate the ants. The goal now was control, not eradication. Indicating how far acceptance of the control entomologists' terms had fallen, the Jackson, Mississippi, Clarion-Ledger reported, "'Eradication' is a dirty word among the small corps of fire ant researchers." 37 Environmental policy created similar, if less severe, professional problems, and for the same reason: the unexpected outcomes of mixing human practices and the biology of the ants. In her rehabilitation of the ants, Carson had excluded any consideration of the role humans played in creating the irruption. This exclusion was part of Carson's more general tendency to see humans as separate from the natural world, a habit of thought that was taken up by later environmental groups and institutionalized by the EPA. This perspective overlooked human responsibility for the fire ant problem and led to solutions that failed to address the root cause of their spread. Insecticides were banned, but the bulldozer revolution continued and the ants continued to spread, covering another hundred million acres by the century's end. They reached western Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and California. Wherever they appeared, their population exploded and they wreaked havoc. 38 Analyses that separated humans and nature obscured the critical importance of interaction between the two.
Many felt vulnerable without a way to stop the spread. The commercial insecticides that were available were for individual use, not widespread spraying, and they could not stop the introduction of the ants into a new area, only ameliorate the danger once they were ensconced. Meanwhile, alternative control techniques were slow in coming. It took the USDA twenty years to initiate a biological control program on a wide scale, and there remains no measure of its effectiveness. The EPA, for its part, blocked the introduction of other alternative techniques. In the early 1970s the biotechnology company Zoecon developed an analogue of a fire ant hormone, a chemical that would prevent ant larvae from developing into adults. This insect growth regulator, as it was called, was expensive to develop and had a smaller market than DDT and other such chemicals since the hormone analogue could be used only against the imported fire ants. But the EPA, following in Carson's tradition, was leery about introducing chemicals into the environment and required that the analogue undergo the same battery of tests as a broad-spectrum pesticide; when Zoecon's president pleaded for grants to help fund the necessary studies, the EPA refused. The cost was prohibitive and the insect growth regulator did not make it to market. Other species-specific chemicals, lacking support from the EPA, experienced similar fates.
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The EPA, then, had banned the chemicals perceived to control the ants, prevented the development of alternative forms of control, and left the ants to spread. Now it was the EPA-not the USDA-that looked like a bureaucracy unconcerned with civil liberties.
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The president of Zoecon made this point when he noted that the Soviet Union had asked his company to develop new pest control methods: the most communist country on earth recognized the innovative possibilities, but an American bureaucracy could not. The USDA exploited the growing resentment toward the EPA in an attempt to win back some of the power it had lost to the agency. Here, too, was one of the roots of the Reagan-era backlash against environmentalism and the EPA, when the agency went into a decade-long dormancy. Exterminator-cum-House Whip Tom DeLay, exercised at the ban on Mirex, charged the EPA with stifling necessary insect control operations under a pile of red tape. Texas Senator Phil Gramm also attacked the EPA's policy on the fire ants, looking-like DeLay-for an excuse to eviscerate the regulatory bureaucracy. 41 The EPA's loss of status was not as stark as that of the control entomologists-the EPA remains the nation's largest regulatory body-nor was its failure as great-the EPA did remove carcinogenic chemicals from the market-but the decline in its legitimacy stemmed from the same cause. The biology of the ants and human activities interacted in unexpected ways. The ants were not ecological innocents, ready to become well-behaved citizens. They were opportunists, exploiting the disruption brought about by the bulldozer revolution and the constant building in the irrigated West. Failing to deal with the causes of the fire ant irruption, the EPA and the environmental community saw their predictions founder and their legitimacy weaken.
CONCLUSION
In 1976, when Mississippi purchased the Mirex manufacturing plant, environmentalists believed that their prophecies had come true. The ideology of eradication had led to American socialism: a state now owned a business. Journalists sympathetic to the anti-insecticide crusade lampooned "Magnolia-Scented Socialism." One newspaper wrote, "A losing effort to conquer a tiny, unconquerable insect has brought a strange and costly species of socialism to the Deep South. Today, the final citadel of this socialism is to be found, of all places, in Mississippi, whose politicians for decades urged the voters to resist any hint of socialism wherever it seemed to be nibbling at the woodwork of free enterprise."
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The situation, though, was not so cut and dried. The imagined ends of the Cold Warvictory, capitulation, or transformation-that had come to stand for the imagined ends of the fire ant wars were too restrictive: magnolia-scented socialism soon collapsed. There was neither victory nor capitulation nor transformation: the ants continued to spread and entomologists continued to battle them in a country that continued to favor relatively weak bureaucratic governance. When it became clear that these imaginings were inadequate, a new view-one less dedicated to castigating or praising the imported fire ants-emerged. A Texas entomologist encapsulated this new view when he wrote in the late 1970s that imported fire ants wear neither a white nor a black hat, but a gray one. The insects do damage crops and they do attack young quail, but they also consume boll weevils. 43 This ambiguous ant is celebrated on the first Saturday of October each year in Marshall, Texas, when the city puts on a Fire Ant Festival. Participants are encouraged to vent their aggression toward the insects by tearing apart a stuffed ant. But they also choose a Miss Fire Ant in a beauty pageant, compete in a fire ant mating call contest, and judge a chili cookoff in which each pot must contain at least one fire ant. The environmentalist and singersongwriter Bill Oliver has captured this new image in song:
You who live in cities, you who live in neighborhoods Fire ants, it's understood, may come and take their stand The males that die in nuptials, the queens that come in multiples, The fire ant, combustible, is hard to understand. 44 The combined tools of the history of science and environmental history, however, make the story of the ants less hard to understand. Environmental history teaches the need to pay attention to the natural world and the effects humans have on it. History of science teaches the need to look at the social processes that are constitutive parts of scientific thought and work. Put together, these techniques reveal intricate and important interconnections between nature and science. The biology of the fire ants mattered-and it was misunderstood by both the USDA and its opponents: the ants were neither specially adapted mutants nor invented bogeymen, but opportunists following the bulldozer across the South. The social history of the competing groups mattered, too, for the fire ant wars were not about Rachel Carson speaking truth to power but about the clash of two different visions of nature, science, and the state.
The interaction of the humans and the fire ants mattered as well. The legitimacy of the USDA control entomologists and their various opponents rested on this interaction, reliant on a nature that did not always behave as predicted but instead responded to a combination of its own rhythms and the actions of humans. Over the past three decades, historians of science have shown how scientists gain and maintain cultural authority through rhetorical techniques and political machinations. A focus on nature adds a new category of analysis to this familiar repertoire: cultural authority depends, as well, on interactions with nature, on making the material world perform in particular, specified ways. Historians of science need ways to integrate the natural world into their accounts to make sense of this-and other-aspects of science. Environmental history offers such tools, opening new paths in the field that build on the hard-won victories of past generations and provide for even fuller historical narratives.
